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I. INTRODUCTION
If the notice provided by patents were twice as clear as it is, it would still be
half as clear as it needs to be. This, loosely speaking, is the upshot of Patent
1
Failure,
a book that should inspire bigger changes in patent law than did the birth
in 1982 of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
The authors, Jim Bessen and Michael Meurer, find that patents in fields
outside chemistry and pharmaceuticals (chem-pharma) currently discourage
innovation overall.2 More specifically, the authors find that, outside chempharma, innovators' patent litigation costs are four times higher than their patent
profits, which implies, when combined with other findings, 3 that the patent
system actually taxes innovation outside chem-pharma.4 Outside chem-pharma,

SeeJAMEs BESSEN & MICHAELJ. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOWJUDGES, BUREAUCRATs,
AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008); see also Maureen Farrell, Roadblocks to Innovation,

FORBES.COM, Mar. 19, 2008, htrp://www.forbes.com/2008/03/19/patents-litigation-innovationent-innovation08-cx-mf 0319innovation.html (interviewing Michael Meurer); Michael Fitzgerald,
A Patentis Worth Having,Rght? Well, Maybe Not,N.Y. TIMES, July, 15, 2007, available at http://nyti
mes.com/2007/07/15/business/yourmoney/15proto.html (discussing Patent Failure and its
impending publication); q.Michael Risch, The Failure ofPubcNoticein PatentProsecution,21 HARV.J.L.
& TECH. 179 (2007) (explaining how differences between claim interpretation during prosecution
and claim interpretation during enforcement undermine notice function of claims).
2 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 96-146.
' Accused infringers tend to spend more on research and development (R&D) than do the
patentees who sue them. This implies that the more a firm spends on R&D, the more likely that
firm is to be sued for infringement. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 123-26; James Bessen &
MichaelJ. Meurer, PatentLizgation with EndogenousDisputes, 96 Am.ECON. REV. 77, 80 (2006);James
Bessen & MichaelJ. Meurer, The PatentLitgaionExplosion (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law Working Paper
No.05-18,2005), availableathttp://ssm.com/abstract=831685. Furthermore, the vast majority of
accused infringers are not pirates. Outside pharmaceuticals, in less than one-half of one percent of
reported opinions does the court hold that the accused infringer actually copied the invention.
Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law 24, 37 (Stanford Pub. Law
Working Paper No. 120160, 2008), availableathttp://ssm.com/abstract=1270160. See also BESSEN
& MEURER, supra note 1, at 126 (estimating that in about four percent of cases infringers are held
liable for enhanced damages for intentional copying). Indeed, in less than one percent of nonpharmaceutical cases does the patentee allege that the infringer copied the patented invention, even
though it is in the interests of a patentee to allege copying if the infringer in fact copied. Cotropia
& Lemley, supra, at 20, 24-26.
4 BESSEN & MEURER, supranote 1, at 138-41. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca A. Eisenberg,
Can PatentsDeterInnovation? The Anicommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCi. 698 (1998) (discussing
"tragedy of the anticommons," in which a resource is under-used because too many partial owners
of the resource can block each other); Francesco Parisi, Norbert Schulz & Ben Depoorter, Duak'y
in Property: Commons andAnticommons,25 INT'LREV. L. & ECON. 578 (2005) (discussing anticommons
generally); ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND
MATERIALS 198-200 (4th ed. 2007), availabk at http://www.bio.org/ip/domestic/TheMythofthe
Anticommons.pdf (discussing prisoner's dilemma logic of patents).
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patent litigation costs tend to be high because the products tend to include many
interrelated components and are thus covered by a patchwork of diverse patents,
many of uncertain scope.' Similarly, profits per patent tend to be low outside
chem-pharma, where profits must be divided up among the patchwork.
Patent Failureis a clarion call for myriad reforms. The first order of business
should be to change the current judicial standard for indefiniteness from
"insolubly ambiguous" 6 to something along the lines of "not particular and
distinct."' Reform of continuation applications should also rank high on the
agenda.' Reform of the doctrine of equivalents, the subject of this Article, should
also rank high. When courts find a patent infringed, they usually find it literally
infringed.9 In only about one of every four or five cases in which a patentee wins
a judgment of infringement is it a judgment of infringement under the doctrine
of equivalents (DOE)." This statistic implies that most patent rents (profits) are
provided by the literal scope of patent claims. Yet, DOE scope is litigated
frequently. One of every two decisions on infringement is a decision on DOE
infringement." Furthermore, the DOE is relevant at some point in time in all
actual and potential patent disputes other than those in which either literal
infringement or invalidity is a slam dunk from the outset.

5

BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 14.

6

Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 341 F.3d 1332, 1340 (Fed. Cit. 2003).

' The Patent Act already requires that patents conclude with one or more claims particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112(2) (2000).
' Applicants use continuations to sit and wait to see what competitors do. Applicants then
amend the pending claims accordingly. The notice costs generated by continuations appear to be
high enough to justify restricting, if not eliminating, them altogether. See Mark A. Lemley &
Kimberly A. Moore, EndingAbuse ofPatentConfinuafions, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 105-17 (2004) (arguing
for reform of continuations). A possible alternative to eliminating continuations would be to allow
them but not give them DOE protection, i.e., to reserve DOE protection for claims of the original
application.
9 This observation is based on the numbers reported in the PatStats Database. Univ. of
Houston Law Ctr., Decisions for 2000-2004, http://www.patstats.org/Patstats2.html (last visited
Oct. 13, 2008) (stating 244 of 383 of infringement cases in favor of patentee based on literal direct
infringement). From 2000 to 2006, United States courts issued 1,283 decisions on literal infringement
and 687 decisions on DOE infringement. SeeUniv. of Houston Law Ctr., PatStats.org, http://www.
patstats.org/PatStats2.html (follow hyperlinks for "Composite Table for 2000-2004," "2005,"
and "2006") (last visited Oct. 13, 2008) (providing data on infringement decisions based on
description and results). Of the 1,283 decisions on literal infringement, twenty-nine percent were
in favor of the patentee; seventy-one percent were in favor of the accused infringer. Id. Of the 687
decisions on DOE infringement, fifteen percent were in favor of the patentee; eighty-five percent
were in favor of the accused infringer. Id.
10 Id.

1 Id.
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Given that literal scope provides most of the incentives that patents provide,
given also that DOE scope is litigated disproportionately often, and given further
that the DOE is relevant in most cases, the DOE appears to generate high notice
costs for every incremental incentive that it provides. The DOE appears to
provide a modest minority of the patent rents while generating a large minority,
if not a majority, of the notice costs.
Part II of this Article explains why we should not abolish the DOE, at least
not without first attempting reform. The DOE provides several social benefits.
Indeed, within a narrow range, the DOE even has a tendency to improve patent
notice. And, as discussed in Part II, there is no good substitute for the DOE.
Part III proposes that we soften the penalty for DOE infringement by staying
permanent injunctions against DOE infringement. For DOE infringement, the
courts should always stay injunctions for a modest period of time (e.g., one year).
The stay should be long enough that, in most cases, the patentee's bargaining
power in settlement negotiations remains strong only if the invention is
technologically significant. That is, we want the patentee's bargaining power to
rest more on the substantive merit of his invention and less on his ability to
exploit the fact that the infringer will have to shut down operations to switch out
the invention.
Part IV proposes that we treat equivalents under 35 U.S.C. 5 112(6) the same
way that we treat equivalents under the DOE. Under current law, we have a
separate jurisprudence for 112(6) equivalents that complicates the doctrine
without fine-tuning patent scope in a meaningful or salutary way. Dropping the
pointless distinctions between DOE equivalents and § 112(6) equivalents will
remove some unnecessary complexity from the law without affecting the
magnitude of equivalents protection.
Part V reassesses the rationales for the doctrine of prosecution history
estoppel and offers thoughts on the issue of whether, in light of PatentFailure,the
absolute bar of Festo P2 beats the flexible bar of Festo H1.13

12

Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo 1), 172 F.3d 1361 (Fed.

Cir. 1999) (barring all equivalents for a limitation narrowed for any reason related to patentability).
" Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo II), 535 U.S. 722 (2002)
(adopting a flexible bar against equivalents whereby the range of the bar is keyed to the reason for
the amendment).
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II. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF THE DOE

A. THE COSTS OF THE DOE

The DOE throws a wrench into the analysis of whether an activity infringes
a patent. To exaggerate a bit, the DOE converts the question of infringement
from a binary question of identity ("is it the same?") to a relative question of
similarity ("is it close enough?"). Consider the following famous cases.
In Winans v. Denmead, the patentee claimed a coal car with a downward
tapering body shaped like a "frustum of a cone." 4 The accused infringer made
a coal car with a downward tapering body shaped like an upside-down octagonal
pyramid, which was eight-sided rather than round in the horizontal plane.' 5 The
accused car did not literally infringe. 6 Was it equivalent? Was an eight-sided car
equivalent to a cone-shaped car for purposes of patent infringement? 7 What if
the accused car were five-sided? What if it were 100-sided?
In Graver Tank & ManufacturingCo. v. Linde Air Products,the patentee claimed
a welding composition "containing a major proportion of alkaline earth metal
silicate."' 8 The accused infringer used a silicate of manganese, which is a
transition metal and not one of the six alkaline earth metals. 9 Clearly, the accused
composition did not literally infringe. For purposes of welding, however, the

14 Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 330 (1853). Winans' claim read:

What I claim as my invention, and desire to secure by letters-patent is, making
the body of a car for the transportation of coal, &c., in the form of a frustum of
a cone, substantially as herein described, whereby the force exerted by the weight
of the load presses equally in all directions, and does not tend to change the form
thereof, so that every part resists its equal proportion, and by which also the
lower part is so reduced as to pass down within the truck frame, and between the
axles, to lower the centre of gravity of the load, without diminishing the capacity
of the car as described.
Id. at 331.
s Id.at 330.
16 Id at 340-42.
17 The Court thought so. The Court held that the differences were merely of form and
insufficient to avoid infringement. Id. at 343. The prior art coal cars were shaped like cubes, having
four sides in the horizontal plane, and the patentee disclosed no specific shapes other than the
frustum of a cone. Id. at 339-44. But it was clear from the specification that the principle of the
invention lay in the equal distribution of weight throughout the car. Id This principle found its
purest expression in the round frustum of a cone, but, from a practical standpoint, an eight-sided
car performed substantially the same function in substantially the same way to achieve substantially
the same result. Id
s Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 613 (1950).
II Id. at 610.
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accused composition worked as well as the claimed composition." Also, the
specification referred to silicates of manganese in a way that made them seem
equivalent to silicates of certain alkaline earth metals. 2 So, is the accused
composition equivalent to the claimed composition?22
In CorningGlass Works v. Sumitomo Electric,the patentee claimed an optical fiber
comprising a glass coating around a glass core, the core including a positive
dopant that raised the core's refractive index above the coating's refractive
index.23 The fiber of the accused infringer had the converse: A negative dopant
in the coating that lowered the coating's refractive index below the core's.24
fiber did not literally infringe. Was it equivalent to the
Clearly, the accused
25
claimed fiber?
In Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., the patentee claimed a
filtration process performed "at a pH from approximately 6.0 to 9.0.,,26 The
accused infringer's filtration process performed at a pH of 5.0.27 The accused
process did not literally infringe. Was it equivalent? Was a pH of 5.0 equivalent
to a pH of "approximately 6.0" in the context of this technology?2"
In Festo II, the patentee claimed a device having two sealing rings each with
one lip.29 The accused infringer's device had one seal with a two-way lip.30 The

20

Id.

21

The patent's specification stated: "We have used calcium silicate and silicates of sodium,

barium, iron, manganese,cobalt, magnesium, nickel and aluminum... in various proportions." Linde
Air Prods. Co. v. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 86 F. Supp. 191,199 (N.D. Ind. 1947) (emphasis added).
Calcium, barium and magnesium are alkaline earth metals. Sodium is an alkali metal. Iron, cobalt
and nickel are, like manganese, transition metals. THE CONDENSED CHEMICALDICTIONARY 39 (6th
ed. 1961).
2 The Court thought so. See GraverTank, 339 U.S. at 613.
2 Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
24

Id. at 1259.

25

The Federal Circuit thought so. Although Sumitomo's core included no positive dopant, the

court denied violating the all-limitations rule. Id. at 1259. The rule requires, wrote the court, that
the claimed limitations (or their equivalents) appear in the accused device. Id. The rule does not
necessarily require that the limitations appear in the same corresponding "component" of the
accused device. Sometimes limitations can be transported to non-corresponding components of the
accused device without destroying equivalence. Id The court did not explain how a component
differs from a limitation, when limitations can be transported, or how a limitation could both be
transported and changed in sign (from positive to negative) and still satisfy the all-limitations rule.
2 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17,22 (1997).
27Id. at 729.
25 The Court thought so. Id.
29 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo II), 535 U.S. 722, 728-29

(2002).
30 Id.at 729.
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accused device did not literally infringe. Was one seal with a two-way lip
equivalent to two sealing rings each with one lip?31
In Johnson & Johnston Assodates v. RE. Service Co., the patentee claimed a
component, for use in printed circuit boards, comprising "a laminate constructed
of a sheet of copper foil ... and a sheet of aluminum .*..."32 The accused
component employed a steel sheet rather than an aluminum sheet.3 3 Clearly the
accused component did not literally infringe. However, the specification stated
that "[w]hile aluminum is currently the preferred material for the substrate, other
metals, such as stainless steelor nickel alloys, may be used."34 Was the accused
steel sheet equivalent to the claimed aluminum sheet?35
As these cases demonstrate, the DOE makes it hard to know what technology
is owned and who owns it.36 This uncertainty generates direct and indirect notice
costs. The direct notice costs-or transaction costs-include the costs of
determining that a patent search is warranted, finding the relevant patents and
their owners, assessing infringement and validity, negotiating licenses, and
litigating. The indirect notice costs come in the form of decreased incentives to
innovate and the ensuing loss to society of innovations that would have been
made but for the decreased incentives.37 The DOE can decrease incentives to
innovate because it increases the risk of patent infringement as well as the reward
of patent protection. The DOE increases both the chance that the inventor's
product will be covered by someone else's patent and the chance that the
inventor's patent will cover somebody else's product.
There is a point beyond which the DOE degrades notice so much that the
DOE decreases incentives to innovate more than it increases them. That is, at
some point the DOE blurs claims so much that it increases an inventor's
expected downside from infringing somebody else's patent more than it increases
the inventor's expected upside from somebody else infringing the inventor's

31 The Court thought so, although it remanded the case for a determination of whether the

doctrine of prosecution history estoppel barred recovery under the DOE. Id. at 722, 741-42.
32 Johnson &Johnston Assocs. Inc. v. R1E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1050 (Fed. Cit. 2002).
33 Id.

Id at 1066 (emphasis added).
3 Steel may be technologically equivalent, but the Federal Circuit held that by disclosing but
never claiming steel, the patentee dedicated the use of steel to the public. Id at 1055. Thus, steel
was not legally equivalent to aluminum. Id The Federal Circuit distinguished Graver Tank by
pointing out that Graver Tank's patent included other claims, claims 24 and 26, that literally
encompassed a broad genus of metal silicates, of which manganese silicate is a species. Id
at 1053-54, n.1. Although claims 24 and 26 were invalid over prior art, the existence of the claims
showed that the patentee did not dedicate manganese silicate to the public-manganese silicate was
not unclaimed. Id
36 BESSEN & MEURER, supranote 1, at 61-62.
3" Id at 9.
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patent. The inventor's expected downside and expected upside do not merely
cancel each other out because patentees and infringers must incur transaction
costs to transfer wealth between them, and because inventors are risk-averse and
weigh losses more heavily than gains of numerically equal magnitude.38
B. THE BENEFITS OF THE DOE

Should we abolish the DOE in its entirety and limit all patent infringement to
literal infringement? Probably not. 39 The DOE can provide benefits in four
ways.
First, the DOE can increase incentives to innovate more than it decreases
them. The DOE increases incentives by decreasing the risk that literal scope will
fall short and thatJones's patent rents will come in below the costs of creating the
invention. The DOE thus resembles insurance: It increases an inventor's
incentive to engage in risky activity (inventing) when he knows that he is exposed
to a class of risk (the failure of literal scope) but can neither easily predict, nor
adopt cheap precautions to obviate, the specific
chain of events through which
4
particular risks in the class could materialize. 0
The rub is that, from the perspective of another inventor, Smith,Jones's DOE
scope resembles a minefield. The DOE scope afforded to Jones's patent increases
the risk and uncertainty faced by Smith. Of course, Smith enjoys the security
afforded by the DOE to her patent, and others fear the DOE scope afforded to
Smith's patent. This tension does not, however, preclude the possibility of the

-s Kurt L. Glitzenstein, A Normative and Positive Anasis of the Scope of Doctrine of Equivalents, 7
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 281, 327 (1994) (discussing risk aversion and DOE).
" For an ostensibly opposing view, see Joshua D. Sarnoff, Abolishing the Doctrine of Equivaknts
and Claiming the Future afterFesto, 19 BERKELEYTECH. L.J. 1157 (2004) ('The modem [DOE] lacks

theoretical justification, imposes high costs on society, and likely impedes innovation."). Samoffs
view is only ostensibly opposing because he distinguishes between the current DOE and a milder
doctrine of non-literal claim scope, reserving the rubric "DOE" and his objection for the former.
Id. at 1212-15. In contrast, I use the term "DOE" more broadly to refer to all forms of non-literal
claim scope.
0 It does not follow from this that the DOE should never rescue patentees from their obvious
errors. Obvious errors are not necessarily avoidable with cheap precautions. It is very expensive to
always avoid all obvious errors. Failure to look in your rear-view mirror seems like an obvious error,
and looking in your rear-view mirror on any given occasion seems like a cheap precaution. But going
a lifetime without ever once failing to look in your rear-view mirror is an expensive precaution. See
general# Mark Grady, Tort Reform: An Economic Approach, 2 J. FORENsIC ECON. 1, 5-7 (1988)
(explaining that for some types of precautions, the most significant cost is the cost of remembering
to always take the precaution); Mark Grady, Why Are People Negfigent?: Technology, Nondurabk
Precautions, and the MedicalMa45racticeExplosion, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 293 (1988) (discussing failure to
remember to take precautions in context of medical care).
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DOE improving incentives overall. Rather, this tension speaks to the need for a
balance in the law of the DOE.
Second, the DOE cuts the costs of drafting claims.4 ' The DOE allows the
drafter to draft a claim as if the reader of the claim will be at least somewhat
cooperative in interpreting its meaning.42 Absent a cooperative reader-absent
assurance that the relevant reader must interpret limitation X as "X and its
equivalents"-the drafter will want to replace or supplement a straightforward
claim to X with one or more of the following" tortuous claims, worded like statutes, that aspire to literally
encompass X and its equivalents;
" functional claim language-such as "means of fastening" rather
than "shoelace"-that aspires to literally encompass X and its
equivalents;
" claim language that literally lists X and all of the individual
equivalents of X that the drafter can think up; or
" a multitude of claims each individually reciting X or one of the
equivalents of X that the drafter can think up.
The resulting claims would be abstract, legalistic, repetitive, or numerous-rn
a word, "convoluted." Convoluted claims, and specifications that support them,
are harder to draft.43 Try, for instance, to draft a claim for Winans using language
that literallyencompasses minor variants (like the accused eight-sided car) as well
as the preferred cone-shaped car-without encompassing the prior art.' It is
much easier to draft a straightforward claim to a cone-shaped car and rely on the
courts to use their equitable powers to cover minor variants. Imagine also the

4 See, e.g., Joseph S. Cianfrani, Note, An Economic Anabsis of the Doctrine of Equivaknts, I VA. J.

L. & TECH. 1, 36 (1997) (stating that DOE allows patentees to obtain scope for which they are
entitled without forcing them to spend excessive resources trying to claim that scope literally).
42 According to the cooperative principle of linguistics, efficient communication requires that
speakers observe various cooperative maxims, and that listeners assume that the speakers are
observing those maxims. See Paul Grice, Logic and Conversation, in SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS, 3:
SPEECH ACTS (P. Cole & J. Morgan eds., Academic Press 1975), reprintedin STUDIES IN THE WAY
OFWORDS 22-40 (I-I.D. Grice ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1989), availabk athttp://www.sfu.ca.-jeff
Pell/Cogs300/GriceLogicConvers75.pdf.
See also Kristen Jakobsen Osenga, The Patent
Conversation (July 2008) (unpublished working paper, http://www.stanford.edu/dept/law/ipsc/
pdf/osenga-kristen.pd.
13 Convoluting claims would also encumber the specification.
Cf Craig A. Nard, A Theory of
Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV.J. L. & TECH. 1, 69 (2000) ("It would simply be too burdensome and
would unduly limit the scope of protection to require a patent applicant to disclose every possible
equivalent in the patent application.").
' Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 331 (1853) (reproducing Winan's actual claim).
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additional disclosure that the Winans specification would have required to support
a claim that literally encompasses minor variants as well as the preferred
embodiment. How valuable to the examiner or to a person of skill in the art is
this additional disclosure over and above the disclosure of the preferred coneshaped car? Once a patent discloses an inventive concept and its best incarnation,
why should the patent recite a litany of minor variants?
Third, although the DOE probably degrades notice overall," the DOE has at
least a partially offsetting tendency to improve notice.46 Just as the DOE has
competing effects on incentives, it has competing effects on notice. When DOE
scope hews close to literal scope, DOE scope might even hit a sweet spot where
it clarifies claim boundaries more than it blurs them. The DOE can clarify claim
boundaries for the same reason that the DOE cuts the costs of claim drafting.
Absent assurance that the reader must interpret X as "X and its equivalents," the
drafter will want to include convoluted claims. Convoluted claims not only cost
more to draft, but also cost more for potential infringers to identify and to
interpret. Furthermore, without DOE protection, drafters have greater incentives
to draft deliberately ambiguous claims. Ambiguous literalscope is itselfa substitutefor
DOE scope. Ambiguous literal scope gives patentees a shot at molding claim
interpretation ex post, especially to cover after-arising technology and technology
far outside the field of the patented invention." Ambiguous literal scope is also
harder to design around than clear literal scope.4' If DOE scope is not available
to buffer literal scope, drafters have greater incentives to create a buffer of
uncertainty around their claims by employing terms whose meanings cannot be
pinned down with confidence.
Fourth, the DOE and the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel (PHE)
constitute, respectively, a carrot and a stick that together discourage applicants
from overreaching during ex parte prosecution. Under PHE, the DOE cannot

s See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
See Douglas Lichtman, SubstitutesfortheDoctrineofEquivaknts: A Response to Meurer and Nard,93
GEO. L.J. 2013, 2024 (2005) (discussing restriction of DOE, abstract claim drafting, and the notice
problem); Samson Vermont, How Restricting the Doctrine of Equivaknts Conflicts - Yes, Conflicts - With
the Notice FunctionofC/aims, LAW.coM, May 31,2001, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.sp?id=90000
5523610 ("[S]caling back the range of equivalents can also impinge on the notice function of
claims.").
" See Risch, supra note 1, at 180-81, 188-89 (discussing ex post gaming that relies on claim
ambiguity).
' See Alan L. Durham, Patent Symmetr, 87 B.U. L. REV. 969, 983-84 (2007) ("[Tjhere are
occasions when claim language is sufficiently clear that competitors of the patentee can 'design
around' it, confident that what they are doing does not literally infringe. That competitors cannot
be equally confident in their freedom from liability is due to the long-established 'doctrine of
equivalents.'").
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cover what a patentee surrendered to obtain the claim. 49 PHE comes into play if,
during prosecution, the applicant amends a claim for a reason related to
patentability and in so doing narrows the claim in some respect, or if, during
prosecution, the applicant argues for a claim interpretation that is narrower in
some respect than the claim's broadest reasonable interpretation.50 PHE deters
overreaching by threatening to take away DOE scope from applicants who claim
the world and leave the entire burden on the examiner to chisel down the claims
to something approaching the true scope of the invention.
In other words, when applicants' words can later be used against them, and
when applicants do not know which claim interpretations will later serve their
interests, they become more humble and circumspect in their claiming and
argument. If applicants could claim and argue whatever they wanted to, with no
potential downside for overreaching that falls short of inequitable conduct,
patents would become even less reliable records of who owns what technology.
C. THE LACK OF GOOD SUBSTITUTES FOR THE DOE

Alleged substitutes for the DOE include reissue applications, continuation
applications, claim amendments, and special techniques for drafting literal
claims. 5' Unfortunately, none of these is a good substitute. Under current law,
each must be employed by a certain deadline. For example, reissues that broaden
claims must be filed within two years after the patent issues.52 Moreover, even if
we removed the deadlines, none of the alleged substitutes would reduce the costs
of drafting claims, none discourage the drafting of convoluted claims, and none
discourage overreaching during prosecution.
Further, none of the alleged substitutes is as useful as the DOE for capturing
after-arising technology (AAT), i.e., technology that does not come into existence
until after the patent is filed or issued. 3 Some commentators argue that the
substitutes cannot cover AAT because the substitutes require that the revised

'9 See WarnerJenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17,30 (1997) (discussing PHE
as legal limitation of DOE).
5 See id. at 30-31 (explaining application of PHE)
51 See Lichtman, supra note 46 (listing and rejecting alleged substitutes for the DOE).
52 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2002).

" There appears to be disagreement about whether AAT is technology that arises after the filing
date or after the issuance date. Compare In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 605 (1977) (stating that afterarising technology is technology that comes "into existence after the filing date..."), with Al-Site
Corp. v. VSI Int'l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308,1320 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (stating that equivalent structure cannot
embrace technology developed after the issuance of the patent because the literal meaning of a claim
is fixed upon its issuance). On first pass, the inability of applicants to add new matter to pending
applications suggests that the filing date should start the clock for AAT.
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literal claims be enabled and described by the application, yet the application
cannot enable and describe technology that did not exist when the application was
filed.'
These commentators put too little faith in literal claims. Literal claims routinely
cover AAT. 5 Otherwise, blocking patents would be impossible.5 6 It is more
accurate to argue that because the substitutes require that the revised literal claims
be enabled and described, the substitutes cannot cover as much AAT as the DOE
can.
Other commentators argue that applicants do not need the DOE to cover
AAT because applicants can use special claim drafting techniques to literally cover
AAT."7 Specifically, applicants can use generic language (e.g., "light source"
instead of "lamp"), terms of degree (e.g., "mostly"), broadening modifiers (e.g.,
"substantially"), functional limitations, negative limitations ("but not.. .'), and
language of result."8
These commentators put too much faith in literal claims. These techniques
are no panacea because they tend to broaden claims both forwards to capture the
future and backwards to capture the prior art. While these techniques help claims
literally encompass AAT, they also increase the odds that claims literally
encompass the prior art.
In any event, it is far from evident that we should encourage applicants to
employ these techniques. These techniques increase the costs of drafting claims
because, again, drafters cannot employ these techniques willy-nilly. These
techniques force drafters to spend more billable hours to ensure that they do not
capture the prior art. When using these techniques, a drafter aims beyond a close
trace around the embodiments specifically disclosed in the application. She aims

4 See Christopher A. Cotropia, 'After-Arising" Technologies and TailoringPatentScope, 61 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 151, 162--63 (2005) (explaining why literal claim scope cannot encompass AAI).
" See Kevin Emerson Collins, The Reach ofLiteral ClaimScope into After-Arising Technology: On the
Construction of Things andMeanings(manuscript at 15, on file with author), availabkathtrp://works.be
press.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?ardde=1003&context=kevincollins ("The simplest way to illustrate
that literal claim scope routinely reaches into AAT is to highlight the everyday occurrence of physical
blocking patents ('blocking patents')-claims in earlier-and later-issued patents that both read on
the same technology.").
56Id.
" See Brief for Applera Corp. et al as Amia Curiae Supporting Respondents (Applera Brief), at 4,
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002) (No. 00-1543), 2001

WL 1548692 ("IThere are relatively few situations in which property claim drafting could not have
covered an accused device due to unforseeability of the claim language."); Michael J. Meurer & Craig
A. Nard, Invention, Refinement and PatentClaim Scope: A New Perspective on the Doctrine of Eqivalents, 93
GEo.LJ. 1947,1971 (2005) ("Ilhe risk of mistake can be mitigated through the efforts of the inventor
and her patent prosecutor.").
s Applera Brief, sapra note 57, at 21-22.
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to gerrymander a fragile silhouette of breadth and precision. This ambition
demands creativity, exercise in logic, consultation with the inventor, and
sometimes even independent research on the part of the drafter.
Moreover, by convoluting literal claims, these techniques degrade the notice
provided by literal claims. Which patent system would provide better notice: one
in which literal claims are straightforward but enjoy a penumbra of equivalents,
or one in which literal claims are convoluted and enjoy absolutely no penumbra
of equivalents? I believe the former system can provide better notice, as long as
the penumbra of equivalents hews close enough to the literal claims that DOE
infringement remains very much the exception rather than the rule.
So far, we have ignored the threshold question of whether the DOE should
cover AAT. If the DOE should not cover AAT, the claim that the alleged
substitutes are good substitutes strengthens. Some commentators point out that
exclusive rights to unforeseeble AAT provide little incentive to invent because
inventors ex ante are little motivated by what they cannot foresee.5 9 Meanwhile,
patent rights to AAT generate monopoly loss and ex post rent dissipation on par
with that generated by patent rights to technology that does not qualify as afterarising.60 Accordingly, patent rights to unforeseeable AAT provide little bang for
the buck.61
However, foreseeability is a matter of degree. When characterized at a high
level of generality, almost all events seem foreseeable. For example, you can
readily foresee the general prospect that you might be in a car accident one day.
It is the details of that accident that are unforeseeable. You cannot readily foresee
precisely when, where, and how that accident would occur. Though, if you tend
to engage in certain patterns of driving, you might have some idea about when,
where, or how such an accident would most likely occur.

'9 See Meurer & Nard, supra note 57, at 1992-93 (proposing that "the DOE should not apply
to unforeseeable later-developed technology because . . . the inventor cannot coordinate
development along a pathway that depends upon unforeseen technology"); Tun-Jen Chiang, Ex Post
Claiming 36 (July 14, 2008) (unpublished working paper, http://ssm.com/abstract=1023829)
(arguing that vague expectations of future benefits confer some incentive, but it is very small); see also
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, ForeseeabihyandCopyrght ncen ives, 122 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009)
(manuscript at 32, on file with author) (referencing Michael Meurer and Craig Nard's argument that
"limiting patent law's doctrine of equivalents-which allows a patentee to control uses of the
invention that weren't foreseeable and therefore not literally covered by the patent's claims-is likely
to have little to no impact on the original incentive"); Gideon Parchomovsky, Peter Siegelman &
Steve Thel, OfEquallWrongsandHa/fRights, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 738,756-57 (2007) (defining windfalls
in terms of unforeseeable and thus un-incentivized gains).
'o Chiang, supra note 59, at 36 ("The incentives conferred by vague expectations of future
benefits is disproportionately smaller than the monopoly costs.").
61 Id. at 36.
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Likewise, inventors ex ante cannot readily foresee the details of AAT, but they
can readily foresee the general possibility of AAT, and they may foresee the rough
outlines of AAT. DOE coverage of AAT can incentivize inventions and save on
claim drafting costs when inventors ex ante foresee the general risk of AAT or its
broad contours, but cannot foresee the precise way in which the AAT will
materialize and cannot otherwise draft claims at low cost to literally encompass
the AAT. In other words, the DOE incentivizes invention and saves on claim
drafting to the extent the inventor foresees a general risk that a valuable product
could slip through his literal claims but cannot foresee, and thus cannot readily
foreclose, the particular path by which the valuable product would slip through
his literal claims.
III. STAY INJUNCTIONS AGAINST DOE INFRINGEMENT

The Patent Act states that courts "may grant injunctions in accordance with
the principles of equity."62 However, when courts find a claim infringed, either
literally or under the DOE, they usually issue a permanent injunction against the
infringer,63 even after the Supreme Court's decision in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange,
LLC' Moreover, courts' decisions about injunction do not turn on whether the
infringer infringed the claim's literal scope as opposed to the claim's DOE
scope.6" The law governing injunction against infringement thus ignores the fact
that DOE scope is blurrier than literal scope. As a result, potential infringers of
DOE scope face a daunting combination of blurry scope and a harsh remedy for
trespassing onto it. They face the harsh remedy of traditional property without
the clear boundaries of traditional property.
Softening the remedy for DOE infringement would mitigate this asymmetry.
Of course, softening the remedy will soften inventors' faith in the DOE, which
will result in less of the benefits that faith in the DOE provides. The larger
question is whether softening the remedy will improve the DOE's ratio of social
costs to social benefits. The answer depends on how we soften the remedy.
I propose that we reserve instant injunctions for literal infringers. DOE
infringers should always enjoy a modest stay (e.g., one year from final judgment)
in which to come into compliance with the permanent injunction. This proposal
reflects the middle position of DOE infringement on the continuum between

62

35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000).

61 See Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1246-47 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("It is the

general rule that an injunction will issue when infringement has been adjudged. . ").
6 PatStats Database, supra note 9 (showing fifty-seven permanent injunctions granted and
seventeen denied since eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.).
6' See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (stating four factor test for
permanent injunction with no reference to whether infringement is literal or DOE).
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liability rules and property rules.66 Property rules provide harsh remedies that
strongly encourage would-be takers to obtain owners' consent in advance.67
Property rules tend to reign where the parties can easily bargain over the property
in advance.68 Liability rules usually aim to award mere actual damages to
entitlement holders, which does not much encourage takers to obtain consent in
advance.69 Liability rules tend to reign where the parties cannot easily bargain
over the entitlements in advance.7 °
In substance, DOE scope lies intermediate the archetypical domains of
property rules and liability rules. Compared to real property, identifying the
periphery of DOE scope and bargaining in advance for the right to traverse it is
a nightmare. On the other hand, DOE scope is far more identifiable and
amenable to bargaining than, say, the levels of precaution adopted by oncoming
drivers.
Today the law treats DOE scope as if it resides deep in the property end zone,
even though the mixed features of DOE scope suggest that it really resides closer
to the fifty-yard line between the property end zone and the liability end zone. In
other words, the law currently denies DOE scope the "third way" treatment it
seems to merit. That would change a bit if we guaranteed DOE infringers a
modest stay, or grace period, to comply with an injunction. A modest stay would
seldom rob the patentee of his ultimate right of exclusion. Nor would a modest
stay increase the burden on courts of valuing inventions. In most cases, the court
will have already assessed infringement damages for the year preceding the date
of the court's judgment.
What is the social harm of, in effect, granting the DOE infringer a compulsory
license that lasts one year from the date of judgment, combined with an order that
the infringer not increase the level of infringement during that year? Of course,

' See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Phabiit Rules, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1, 27-29
(2002-03) (defining conditions under which entitlements should be governed by hybrids of liability
and property).
67 DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, LAW'S ORDER: WHAT ECONOMICS HAS TO Do WITH LAW AND WHY
IT MATTERS 57-59 (2000). See general#fMichael I. Krauss, Property Rules vs. Liabikt Rules, in THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (B. Bouckaert & G. De Geest eds. 1999), available at
http://encydo.findlaw.com; WARD FARNSWORTH, THE LEGAL ANALYST: A TOOLKIT FOR
THINKING ABOUTTHE LAW 188-97 (2007); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Propery Rules,
Liabilt Rules, and Inalienabifit: One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Liabiki Rules: An EconomicAnatsis,109 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996); Bell
& Parchomovsky, supra note 66; Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liabiity Rules, and Uncertainty about
Property Rights, 106 MICH. L. REv. 1285 (2008).
6 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 67, at 57-59 (explaining that property rules are attractive when the
cost of transferring rights through the market is low).
69

Id.

70 id
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the stay will weaken the patentee's bargaining power, but it will do so more when
the patentee's bargaining power is a function, not of the technological merit of his
invention, but of the DOE infringer's sunk costs and of flaws in the patent
system such as poor notice and porous gates against obvious patents. Compared
to a patentee whose invention is technologically significant, a patentee whose
invention is technologically trivial derives a greater proportion of his bargaining
leverage from the ability to enjoin the infringer's operation. If the invention is
trivial-in the sense of being easy to design around or not being better than the
alternatives-the infringer will pay only a low royalty to continue using the
invention after the stay expires. If the patented invention is significant-in the
sense of being hard to design around or being better than its alternatives-the
infringer will pay a high royalty to continue using the invention after the stay
expires.
The threat of being enjoined from using something trivial would not be so
problematic if infringers could reliably identify and interpret the relevant patents
in advance. But infringers often cannot. Indeed, the more trivial the innovation
in question, the less likely a reasonable infringer would regard that innovation as
a potentially patentable invention that merits a patent search in advance of
commercialization. In other words, the closer an invention is to being obvious,
the higher are the odds that someone will not only infringe a patent on that
invention but do so inadvertently. Not only is a reasonable infringer less likely to
search for a patent on some invention that is borderline obvious, the infringer is
also more likely to independently invent that invention.
IV. USE THE SAME STANDARDS FOR 112(6) EQUIVALENTS

Under 35 U.S.C. § 112(6), a claim that expresses a limitation as "a means or
step for performing a specified function... shall be construed to cover the
corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and
equivalents thereof"' The Federal Circuit has said that these statutory equivalents
are subject to the same "insubstantial change" test as the equitable equivalents
available under the DOE.7" Yet, the Federal Circuit distinguishes § 112(6)
equivalents from DOE equivalents. The Federal Circuit says that § 112(6)
equivalents define the literalscope of the claim's functional language.
Can DOE equivalents be applied on top of § 112(6) equivalents? Can there
be "equivalents of equivalents"? No court decision suggests that there can be
such double expansion of a functional limitation. But why not? If § 112(6)
equivalents really define literal scope, why isn't that literal scope entitled to the

7

35 U.S.C. S 112(6) (2000) (emphasis added).
Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., 145 F.3d 1303,1309 (Fed. Cit. 1998).
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DOE equivalents to which literal scope is normally entitled? If § 112(6)
equivalents really define literal scope, then "equivalents of equivalents" are really
DOE equivalents of literal scope.
Can DOE equivalents be applied instead of § 112(6) equivalents? Maybe. A
few opinions suggest that DOE equivalents are available to expand a functional
limitation in a direction that § 112(6) equivalents cannot expand, namely, forward
to cover after-arising technology (AAT).73 In Al-Site Cotp. v. VSI Int'l., Inc., the
Federal Circuit said that literal scope is keyed to the issue date and, because
§ 112(6) equivalents define literal scope, they cannot embrace AAT.74
Section 112(6) equivalents can only embrace things available when the patent
issued.75 In contrast, DOE equivalents are keyed to the date that infringement
began and can encompass AAT.76 Thus, AAT could infringe under the DOE
without infringing under § 112(6). 77 In sum, AI-Site suggests that for functional
limitations, § 112(6) equivalents should be applied to things available when the
patent issued and that the DOE should be applied to things that arose later.78
The jurisprudence of§ 112(6) equivalents is a mess that gets messier the more
one looks at it. 79 Furthermore, claims with functional limitations often also

" See Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int'l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1320-21 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (comparing
§ 112(6) equivalents to DOE equivalents); NOMOS Corp. v. BrainLab U.S.A., Inc., 357
F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that DOE may apply to means plus function limitation,
if necessary, to cover AAT).
74
An equivalent structure or act under § 112 cannot embrace technology
developed after the issuance of the patent because the fiteralmeaning of a claim is
fixed upon its issuance. An "after arising equivalent" infringes, if at all, under the
doctrine of equivalents. Thus, the temporaldifference between patent issuance and
infringement distinguish an equivalent under § 112 from an equivalent under the
doctrine of equivalents. In other words, an equivalent structure or act under
§ 112 for literal infringement must have been available at the time of patent
issuance while an equivalent under the doctrine of equivalents may arise after
patent issuance and before the time of infringement. An "after-arising"
technology could thus infringe under the doctrine of equivalents without
infringing literally as a § 112, 1 6 equivalent.
Al-Site, 174 F.3d at 1320 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
75 Id.
76 id
" Imagine a claim that recites, "An athletic shoe comprising a means for detachably fastening
said left upper portion to said right upper portion." The specification discloses laces, buttons, hooks
and zippers as means for detachably fastening. Velcro is invented years later. Under AI-Site, Velcro
could not be a § 112(6) equivalent but could be a DOE equivalent.
71 Id.at 1320.
" See Dawn Equip. Co. v. Kentucky Farms, Inc., 140 F.3d 1009, 1018-22 (1998) (describing §
112(6) equivalents law as"confused and confusing"); Cyril P. Rigamonti, Conflcing Theories of
Equivaknce: 35 U.S.C. f 112, 6 in the Supreme Court and the FederalCircuit, 40 IDEA 163 (2000)
(concluding that the Federal Circuit should not interpret 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6 as creating a new and
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include non-functional limitations. In such cases, the court may have to apply the
law of § 112(6) equivalents to some limitations, the law of DOE equivalents to
other limitations, and sometimes the law of both types of equivalents to the same
limitations. Realistically speaking, however, the probability that an accused
product infringes does not detectably depend on whether a court purports to
apply the law of § 112(6) equivalents or the law of the DOE.
The upshot is that the distinctions between § 112(6) equivalents and DOE
equivalents are not worth their weight. The distinctions complicate doctrine
without fine-tuning patent scope in a meaningful, much less a salutary, way. The
initial rationale for labeling § 112(6) equivalents as statutory, and thus distinct
from DOE equivalents, was simply that the patent statute refers to "equivalents"
in § 112(6).80 This rationale puts too fine a point on the matter. Anyway, there
is no evidence that Congress or the drafters of the Patent Act intended that
112(6) equivalents be treated differently.8
We should simply treat § 112(6) equivalents the same as DOE equivalents,
with one exception. The exception is that for functional limitations, we should
apply the DOE not to the functional claim language per se, but to the structure
disclosed in the specification that corresponds to that claim language. In other
words, if we want to retain some distinction between § 112(6) equivalents and
DOE equivalents, the distinction should reside solely in what gets compared to
what. For the DOE, we compare the accused element to the claimed limitation
and ask whether the accused element is equivalent to that claimed limitation. For
§ 112(6), we should compare the accused element to the disclosed structure that
corresponds to the claimed limitation and ask whether the accused element is
equivalent to that disclosed structure.
V. REEVALUATE PROSECUTION HISTORY ESTOPPEL

Under the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel (PHE), the DOE cannot
cover what a patentee surrendered to obtain the claim.82 PHE comes into play if,
during prosecution, the applicant amends a claim for a reason related to
patentability and in so doing narrows the claim in some respect, or if, during
prosecution, the applicant argues for a claim interpretation that is narrower in
83
some respect than the claim's broadest reasonable interpretation.

distinct form of equivalents); Paul M. Janicke, The Crisis in Patent Coverage: Defining the Scope of an
Invention by Funtion, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 155 (1994) (discussing the modem application of 35
U.S.C. § 112, 6 and its future).
80 Rigamonti, supra note 79, at 166 (statutory basis for "equivalents clause").
Id. at 165 (discussing the absence of legislative history regarding 112(6)).
82 SeeJANICE M. MUELLR, AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW 298-99 (2d ed. 1987).
83

Festo Corp. v. Skoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (FestoIl), 535 U.S. 722,733-34 (2002)
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In Festo II, the Court held that any narrowing amendment is: (1) presumed to
be for a reason related to patentability; and (2) presumed to bar all equivalents for
the amended limitation.' If the patentee rebuts (1), the amendment does not bar
equivalents. ss If the patentee cannot rebut (1), he may still capture equivalents
ranging as far as the extent to which he rebuts (2).86 He can rebut (2) in three
ways, by showing- that the equivalent was unforeseeable, that the reason for the
amendment was unrelated to the purported equivalent, or some other reason that
he could not reasonably be expected to literally claim the equivalent. 7
Jay Thomas argues that PHE is not worth the candle and that we should
ignore the prosecution history."8 First, he argues, in most areas of the law
estoppel requires detrimental reliance."9 Generally, someone has to rely on the act
or statement to their detriment. Yet, in patent cases courts do not ask whether
the accused infringer actually relied on the prosecution history. Second, accused
infringers do not usually examine the prosecution history until after they have
been accused of infringement." Third, to the extent that accused infringers do
rely in advance on the prosecution history, they do so largely because the doctrine
of PHE exists.9 If it did not exist, accused infringers would seldom rely on the
prosecution history.
These arguments are compelling, but they sidestep the main rationale for
PHE. Its main rationale is to deter applicants from overreaching during ex parte
prosecution. When the applicant's words and representations can be used against
him, and when he is unsure which claim interpretation will serve his interests in
the future, he chooses his words and representations more carefully and with
more fealty to the truth.

(stating that when a patentee narrows a claim in response to a rejection, "he may not argue that the
surrendered territory comprised unforeseen subject matter that should be deemed equivalent to the
literal claims of the issued patent").
84 Id. at 733-34, 737.
8' Id. at 735-40.
86 id.

Id. at 740-41.
John R. Thomas, On PreparatoryTexts andProprietagyTechnologies: The Place ofProsecutionHistories
in Patent ClaimInterpretation, 47 UCLA L. REV. 183 (1999) [hereinafter Thomas, Preparatory Texts];
John Thomas, Presentation: A Case Against Using the Doctrine of Equivalents and Prosecution Histogy
Estoppel, CASRIP Publication Series: Rethinking Intellectual Property 97-100 (No. 6) (2000)
[hereinafter Thomas, A CaseAgainstUsing, available athttp://www.law.washington.edu/casrip/sym
posium/number6/thomas2.pdf.
89 Thomas, Preparatogy Texts, supra note 88, at 202.
o See id. at 203 ("[T]he number of technologists who sift through Patent Office files in order
to be misled by statements of their competitors, while not zero, seems small indeed.").
" See id. at 200 (patent bar response to emphasis on prosecution histories in claim
87

interpretation).
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This rationale can be framed in terms of general reliance. In general, the threat
posed by PHE allows examiners to rely more on applicant arguments and claims.
If applicants could argue and claim whatever they wanted to, with no expected
punishment for overreaching, patent examinations would become more difficult
and patents would become less reliable records for the public at large.
Thomas also argues that PHE is superfluous over the prior art limit on DOE
scope.92 That is, PHE is an inferior proxy for the question of whether the
purported equivalent falls into the prior art.93 This argument is compelling, but
likewise falls short. PHE is not superfluous over the prior art limit on DOE
scope. As Thomas acknowledges, PHE applies not only to amendments and
arguments that avoid prior art, but also to amendments and arguments that head
off other problems with patentability such as lack of written support.94 Further,
PHE constrains DOE scope more than the prior art does. The prior art merely
prevents the scope of equivalents from extending beyond the forward edge of the
95
prior art. Under the absolute bar of Festo I, PHE reduces DOE scope to zero.
Under the flexible bar of Festo II,96 PHE need not reduce DOE scope to zero but,
if there is any unrebutted PHE, DOE scope will not extend all the way to the
forward edge of the prior art. Finally, as discussed above, what applicants say
matters because what applicants say affects the chances that the claims they want
will issue. That is, courts should monitor what applicants say because what they
say affects what examiners do.
Of course, PHE has its costs. It complicates infringement analysis, 97 which
directly increases the costs of patent clearance, licensing, and litigation. Further,
some examiners may rely on PHE itself. Examiners who are aware of PHE may
think they have done enough when they record a narrowing amendment or
argument somewhere in the prosecution history, rather than requiring that

92 Id. at 229; Thomas, A CaseAgainst Using, supra note 88, at 99.

9 "Let us just look objectively at the prior art. Who cares what the applicant says? His opinion
does not matter. We are not interested in the intentions of the applicant. What we want to know
is what the instrument says, what the content of the prior art is." Thomas, A CaseAgainst Using, supra
note 88, at 99.
" Thomas, PreparatogyTexts, supra note 88, at 231 (written description requirement). See, e.g.,
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo II), 535 U.S. 722, 724 (2002) (§ 112
requirements and estoppel).
" See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo ), 172 F.3d 1361, 1372
(Fed. Cit. 1999).
96 Festo II, 535 U.S. at 741 (holding a patentee can rebut presumption that PHE applies by
showing "that at the time of amendment one skilled in the art could not reasonably be expected to
have drafted a claim that would have literally encompassed the alleged equivalent"); see also infra
note 103 and accompanying text (giving additional showings to rebut bar on equivalents).
97 "[We are creating wheels within wheels of elaborate doctrine to try to figure out when there
is an estoppel." Thomas, A Case Against Using supra note 88, at 3.
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everything necessary to interpret a claim appear explicitly in the claim or the
specification. This habit of examiners increases the burden on potential infringers
and others who must analyze claims because these amendments and arguments
tend to be buried in long prosecution histories. PHE also increases the costs of
claim drafting and prosecution because applicants strive to master the doctrine's
fine points and to strategize at length to avoid an estoppel.
Do the benefits of the doctrine of PHE outweigh its costs? I want to
conclude that the threat of penalty for overreaching promotes overall efficiency
much the same way that the threat of criminal punishment promotes efficiency
despite the costs of apprehending and incarcerating criminals.
It is harder to conclude, however, that the doctrine will remain beneficial in
the future. The process of obtaining a patent grant from the government may
become more adversarial. Inter partes reexamination is now available, and the
United States may soon adopt more liberal means of post-grant review. 98 By
deterring applicants from overreaching, these adversarial processes serve as at
least partial substitutes that can take over some of the police work that PHE
performs today.
On the other hand, reformers have proposed reforms to the doctrine of
inequitable conduct that would decrease the frequency of, or the consequences
of, findings of inequitable conduct.99 Both PHE and the doctrine of inequitable
conduct discourage applicants from overreaching during ex parte prosecution.
If reform of the doctrine of inequitable conduct renders it less threatening to
applicants, PHE may become more socially valuable because PHE can take over
some of the police work that the doctrine of inequitable conduct performs today.
More useful is to ask whether reform can improve PHE's ratio of costs to
benefits. PatentFailureshows that, in general, we need more bright lines, especially
100
bright lines that facilitate bargaining in advance of R&D or commercialization.
Unfortunately, having bright lines is always in tension with having the flexibility
later to reach the right result on the substantive merits in the case at hand. Bright
lines are always in tension with substantive accuracy or justice in hard cases.
Good law makes hard cases. To make the law better, we must be more willing to
take hard stands and reach results that seem wrong under the oddball facts of
exceptional cases.

9' See Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.L 1908, 110th Cong. §§ 6, 9 (2007); Patent Reform Act
of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 5, 7 (2007).
99 S. 1145 §§ 11-12; H.R. 1908 § 11.
100See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 7-10, 21-27, 46-54 (explaining that when investors
cannot identify who owns what technology in advance-because patent boundaries are unclear and
unpredictable-investors' litigation risks will tend to exceed their expected revenue from investment
in innovative products).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2008

21

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 5

J. INTELL PROP.L

[Vol. 16:83

In deference to the notice function of claims, the Federal Circuit set forth a
bright line in Festo L 0 1 Under the absolute bar of Festo I, any narrowing
amendment related to patentability irrebuttably bars all equivalents for the
amended limitation." 2 In Festo II, the Supreme Court re-blurred the line by
holding that a patentee may rebut the bar and capture equivalents ranging as far
as the extent to which the patentee can show that: the equivalent was
unforeseeable, the amendment was unrelated to the purported equivalent, or
some other reason
that he could not have been expected to claim the purported
13
equivalent.
On first pass, and with PatentFailurein mind, the absolute bar of Festo I seems
more attractive than the flexible bar of Festo I. Under Festo I, the effects of PHE
on DOE scope are easier to estimate in advance. Under Festo I, any narrowing
amendment simply erases all DOE scope for the amended limitation.
Festo I also seems to go hand in hand with reform of the DOE. If DOE
scope, or the penalty for violating it, is cut back, there will be less equivalency for
PHE to take away in the first place. The absolute bar of Festo Iwould increase the
average relative size of the chunk of equivalency that PHE takes away, which could
offset what would otherwise be a drop in the applicant's expected downside from
overreaching during prosecution. In other words, if we curtail the DOE through
reform, the DOE pie will be smaller; but if we also adopt the absolute bar of Festo
I, PHE will take away a proportionately larger slice of that smaller pie.
There is a problem, however, with the absolute bar of Festo I. It punishes
minor overreaching just as harshly as it punishes egregious overreaching. Under
Festo I, a small narrowing amendment and a big narrowing amendment bar the
same amount of DOE scope for the amended limitation-all of it. The Supreme
Court characterized this mismatch between the crime and the punishment as
foreign to equity."
The mismatch may also be inefficient. If a narrowing amendment of any
magnitude kills all DOE scope, applicants could respond in various ways. Some
applicants could go to great lengths to avoid amending claims after filing. These
applicants would search the prior art before filing, draft the original claims very
carefully, and look for alternative ways to influence examiners, thereby driving up
the costs of claim drafting and prosecution. Other applicants could deliberately
claim less than they have invented, in the belief that overly narrow literal scope
plus DOE scope is broader than accurate literal scope plus zero DOE scope.

101 Festo

Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Ferto 1), 172 F.3d 1361 (Fed.

Cir. 1999).
102 Id. at 1372.
103 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo II), 535 U.S. 722, 725 (2002).
'o

See Festo II, 535 U.S. at 738.
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Still, other applicants could overreach more egregiously, reasoning that if the
punishment for grand larceny is the same as the punishment for petty theft, they
might as well commit grand larceny.
More thought, and perhaps data, are necessary before we can conclude that
the absolute bar's benefits (from clarifying DOE scope and increasing the fraction
of DOE scope that PHE withholds) outweigh the absolute bar's costs (from
distorting claim drafting and failing to promote marginal deterrence).
Accordingly, here I can offer no specific reform of the doctrine of PHE.
VI. CONCLUSION

Under current law, most patent suits are suits against inadvertent infringers as
opposed to suits against pirates. Rarely does a court find that an infringer actually
copied the patented invention. Indeed, rarely does a patentee even allege that the
infringer copied.'05 Furthermore, according to Bessen and Meurer, accused
06
infringers tend to spend more on R&D than do the patentees who sue them.'
This implies that the more a firm invests in new technology, the more that firm
risks inadvertently infringing someone else's patent. The consequence, according
to Bessen and Meurer, is that patents outside chemistry and pharmaceuticals
actually discourage innovation and that most innovators would be better off with
no patent system than with the one we have.'l 7
If the authors' data holds up under scrutiny, dramatic reform should follow.
Even if the revised figures are less damning of the status quo than the authors',
it is difficult to believe that the revised figures would be so improved as to belie
the take-home message of PatentFailure,which is that, in terms of magnitude and
importance, the costs of poor notice swamp the issues that most patent
commentators spend most of their time worrying about.
We should worry about the DOE. It generates a big chunk of patent notice
costs while providing only a modest chunk of patent incentives. At first glance,
outright abolition of the DOE is tempting. A tamer version of the DOE,
however, is likely better than no DOE at all. The competing effects of the DOE
point to the need for a balance, not for abolition, at least not without first trying
serious reform.
DOE scope is double-edged. To its owner, a patch of DOE scope is like an
umbrella insurance policy. InventorJones's DOE scope increases his incentive
to engage in risky activity (inventing) and decreases Jones's incentive to adopt
costly precautions (like painstaking claim drafting), when he knows that he is

105 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
"o
107

See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 95-146.
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exposed to a class of risk (failure of literal scope to recoup his cost of the
invention) but can neither predict, nor otherwise adopt cheap precautions to
obviate, the chain of events through which specific risks in the class could
materialize. To Smith, a potential infringer, Jones's patch of DOE scope is like

a minefield. Jones's DOE scope increases Smith's risk. Of course, Smith enjoys
the security afforded by her own patch of DOE scope, and other parties fear her

DOE scope. Again, this tension-between the tendency of a patch of DOE
scope to decrease the risk of inventing for its owner and to increase the risk of
inventing and commercializing for others-calls for a balance in the DOE, a
balance that ensures that the DOE lowers risk for inventors more than it
increases it.
I have proposed that we soften the remedy for DOE infringement and
collapse § 112(6) equivalents into the DOE. These reforms are not enough by

themselves to tame the DOE. Nor is PHE the only legal limit on DOE scope
that needs to be reassessed.' 5 Some of the legal limits seem inconsistent with
each other, some seem redundant, and some seem to create perverse incentives. °9

Unsurprisingly, the courts apply them ad hoc."'

108 See, e.g., Paul R. Michel, The Rok and Responsibil'y of PatentAttornys in Improving the Doctrine of

Equivaknts, 40 IDEA 123 (2000) (stating that judges face challenges in determining when the alllimitations rule arises); Sarnoff, supra note 39 ('The Supreme Court's new vitiation standard for the
modem doctrine of equivalents is particularly problematic .... ."); John Mills, Three 'Non-obvious"
Modifications to Simpti6 and Rein in the Doctrine of Equivaknts, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 649, 650 (2004-05)
("[Clourts should include secondary considerations when determining the scope of equivalents.");
Jeremy T. Mart, Foreseeabiiyas a Bar to the Doctrine of Equivaknts, 2003 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH.
F. 103101 (2003) (identifying open questions regarding the use of foreseeability as a bar to
equivalents). But cf Paul M. Janicke, On the Causesof Unpredictabi'oof FederalCircuitDecisionsin Patent
Cases, 3 Nw.J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 93, 109-10 (2005) (asserting that there is consensus on the
major doctrinal points of patent law).
'09 With respect to perverse incentives, for example, consider the public dedication rule. Under
this rule, the DOE cannot cover subject matter that the patentee disclosed but failed to claim.
Johnson &Johnston Assocs., Inc. v. KE. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046,1054 (Fed. Cit. 2002). This rule
increases the costs of drafting applications, because it encourages drafters both to think more deeply
about the shape that the claims will eventually assume and to comb through draft applications to
remove anything unnecessary to support that shape. Concomitantly, this rule also penalizes
patentees who disclose more information than they need to support the claims, which seems
perverse insofar as the information disclosure rationale for the patent system holds water.
110One can get a feel for the ad hoc jurisprudence of the legal limits by comparing Graver Tank
& Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 305 (DOE held to cover disclosed but unclaimed use
of manganese), to Johnson &JohnstonAssocs., Inc., 285 F.3d at 1046 (DOE held not to cover disclosed
but unclaimed use of steel), and by comparingPennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland Inc., 833 F.2d 931
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (for DOE to apply, all limitations in claim must appear in literal or equivalent form
in the accused device), to Coming Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251 (Fed.
Cir. 1989) (holding that DOE applies despite recital in claim of positively doped core and absence
thereof in accused device).
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The tests for technological equivalence". are also vexing. The overarching
test-are the differences between the claimed invention and the accused device
"insubstantial"?-merely rephrases the question."' The function-way-result
subtest" 3 seems a bit more useful but it would be nice to know how its function
prong differs from its result prong. If an accused device has substantially the
same function as the claimed device, when would the accused device not achieve
substantially the same result as the claimed device? A dictionary definition of the
word "function" is "the action for which a person or thing is specially fitted or
used.""' 4 This definition seems to imply that referring to a thing's function is
merely a way of referring to the result achieved by the thing. Is this three-prong
subtest really a two-prong subtest?
The DOE needs a lot of work."'

'11 The judge determines legal equivalence.* The jury, or the judge in a bench trial, determines
technological (or factual) equivalence. See Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609-10.
12 Durham, supranote 48, at 971,992-93. Durham proposes that we partially merge the test for
equivalents and the test for obviousness.
The test I will propose is this: the accused combination is equivalent to the
claimed combination if, at the time the patent application was filed, a person of
ordinary skill in the art, aware of both the claimed combination andthesubs'ituted
element, would have found it obvious to make the substitution.
Id. at 973-74 (emphasis added). His proposal merits serious consideration.
13 Under the function-way-result subtest, an accused element is technologically equivalent to the
claimed element if the accused element performs substantially the same function in substantially the
same way to achieve substantially the same result. See Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608.
114 MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATEDICTIONARY 507 (Frederick C. Mish ed., 11 th ed. 2003).
"' See Michel, supranote 108 (stating that the DOE "has proven to be the most difficult and least
predictable of all doctrines in patent law to apply"); Sarnoff, supra note 39.
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